



Darwinism and Social Science: Is there Any Hope for the Reductionist? 
Jesús P. ZAMORA BONILLA 
This monographic section of Theoria is devoted to one of the most active topics of re-
search in the foundations of the social sciences: the complex and disputed relations-
hips these sciences may have with the dominant conceptual framework in biology, i.e., 
Darwinism. Though there have been discussion about this topic even since the publi-
cation of Darwin’s Origin of the Species, the issue itself evolves as new approaches and 
discoveries appear in biology and as new concepts and analytical tools are developed 
in the social sciences. We can also assert that, as it is the case in the Darwinian non-
teleological view of evolution, the ramifications of the debate about ‘Darwinism and 
social sciences’ seem hardly to have a clear directionality, and recent developments on 
this philosophical question lead authors and readers towards a vast variety of approa-
ches and conclusions. The papers contained in this section attempt to be representati-
ve of this variety, not only because of the different aspects that have been chosen in 
each case (some more general, some more specific), but also because of the diverse in-
tellectual perspectives that sustain the approaches developed by their contributors, all 
of them active and prominent researchers in the field. 
 By way of introduction, let me pose very briefly some relevant questions that arise 
regarding the relationship that Darwinism may have to the foundations of social 
science. In the first place, the old dream of scientific reductionism conceived the pro-
gress of knowledge as directed towards an ideal state in which every scientific discipli-
ne would have been condensed in a comprehensive list of axioms from which everyt-
hing known about this discipline could be mathematically derived, and in such a way 
that those axioms could be in their turn deduced from the principles of more ‘basic’ 
disciplines: so, the complete ‘laws’ of chemistry should be derivable from the ‘laws’ of 
physics, those of biology from those of chemistry, those of psychology from those of 
biology, those of sociology from those of psychology, and so on. However, if we have 
learned something from the debate in philosophy of science during the last three de-
cades, it has been that not only is there absolutely no hope of ever ‘reducing’ any dis-
cipline to any other, but even that no discipline (save probably some very simple and 
idealized parts of them) can actually and usefully be organized in an axiomatic fashion, 
mainly because the way in which scientific fields are ‘covered’ are not through the dis-
covery of universal ‘covering’ laws, but through the piecemeal accumulation of more 
or less successful ‘partial’ models, which too often are in mutual conflict. 
 On the other hand, this has not precluded the attempts of connecting some disci-
plines to others, either ‘more fundamental’ or not; rather on the contrary, scientific 
disciplines are much more promiscuous, and their limits much blurrier, than what 
simplified positivistic approaches had seem to suggest. Models are built by exploiting 
everything researchers can wisely employ, and if a discipline provides methods and re-
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sults which can serve as efficient inputs into a research process of other discipline, 
they will be exploited. A prominent example is the spectacular development of bio-
chemistry and molecular biology in the second half of the past century: even if it is 
true that no reduction of their ‘principles’ (if such a thing exists at all as a list of for-
mulable statements) to those of chemistry or quantum physics is feasible, the fact is 
that physical and chemical knowledge is massively put into use both in the production 
of new knowledge about biological substances and processes, and in the development 
of theoretical explanation of these. Something similar could be expected to take place 
in the relation between biology, psychology, and the social sciences: it is possible that 
discoveries about the evolution of humans, about the working of our neural system, 
or about our metabolism, become some day as useful to social science as chemical 
knowledge is now for biology? In particular, is it of any use to social sciences the fact 
that our features as a biological species must have arisen from a Darwinian process of 
aleatory variation cum retentive selection? The full discipline of ‘sociobiology’ (or, as its 
practitioners now prefer to call it, ‘evolutionary psychology’) is just devoted to follow 
this line of thought, although, lacking in general an empirical access to the actual evolu-
tionary processes that led to our species, most of the work in this field is irremediably 
speculative, and subjected to all kinds of ideological influences and other cognitive bi-
ases. Some of the risks associated to this attempt are explained in the paper by Peter 
Saunders: ‘Bricks without straw: Darwinism in the social sciences’, which bases its ma-
jor criticism on the fact that neither Darwinism nor neo-Darwinism are able of offe-
ring, just by themselves, detailed and systematic explanations of the appearance of 
new biological forms, much less of the development of social and cultural realities. 
This is not to suggest that Darwinism is ‘false’, only that it is unable of providing a 
comprehensive explanation of all the aspects of the living world, just as the energy 
conservation principle, though true, is not enough to explain by itself the chemical 
composition of the sun, for example. Jack Vromen’s paper, ‘Why the economic con-
ception of human behavior might lack a biological basis’, is also critical to the attempt 
to espouse sociobiological explanations with rational-choice-type arguments, mainly 
because of the circularity which one commits when uses rational-choice models to ex-
plain how rational-choice cognitive processes may have evolved themselves.  
 All this leads us to a different but related question: is it possible to connect Darwi-
nism with social sciences, not just by showing that our biological evolution may have 
also created our social and cultural features, but by showing that the dynamics of cul-
tural and social evolution follows the same formal structure than the evolution of spe-
cies? This line of thought has led to the development at least a couple of disciplines: 
evolutionary game theory (the attempt of explaining the genetic dynamics of a popula-
tion as a ‘competition’ at the level of genes, analysed through the techniques of the 
mathematical theory of games) and ‘memetics’ (the attempt of explaining the dissemi-
nation of cultural traits as parallel to the process of Darwinian selection).1 In a way, 
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these are different aspects of the attempt of constructing a ‘universal Darwinism’2, of 
which biological Darwinism would only be a single facet: everything which were capa-
ble of sustaining a ‘replicator dynamics’ would necessarily evolve through a more or 
less Darwinian trajectory. Nevertheless, both the goals and the deeds of these discipli-
nes have also been subjected to several criticisms; for example, perhaps the notion of 
evolution is more general than that of Darwinian evolution, and the realizing of this 
difference may allow developing new and more powerful ways of connecting different 
disciplines in which evolutionary phenomena are studied. Ulrich Witt’s paper, ‘Gene-
ric features of evolution and its continuity - a transdisciplinary perspective’, just deli-
neates some guiding lines for framing different types of evolutionary processes into a 
single, coherent definition, which could illuminate the ways in which evolutionary 
techniques and ideas can be profitably applied across different disciplines. 
 One field of social sciences where evolutionary approaches have been thoroughly 
pursued during the last two decades has been economics, mainly because many aut-
hors have seen in these approaches, either as a way of departing from the strictures 
and shortcomings of neoclassical economics (too strongly linked, according to some, 
to static equilibrium analysis), or as a way of biologically justifying the main assump-
tions of the neoclassical schools. Pablo García’s paper, ‘Knowledge in economics: an 
evolutionary viewpoint’, critically surveys some of the main approaches that have been 
developed along the first of these possibilities, focusing mainly on the study of tech-
nology as an essentially developing reality. Lastly, Jack Vromen’s paper, which I have 
already referred to above, explores some of the perils of the second line of thought, 
that of defending neoclassical economics on the basis of sociobiological speculations. 
 I am deeply grateful to all the contributors for their effort in jointly producing a 
monographic section that, as I am sure, will be very useful for those readers that try to 
get a precise idea of the diversity of questions lying under the topic of ‘Darwinism and 
social science’. The authors have also been very kind in responding to the complex 
constraints about time, extension and subject matter I put to them. I wish also to 
thank the editors of Theoria, and particularly to Andoni Ibarra, for the invitation to put 
together this monographic section, and for all the facilities they gave me. Lastly, the 
ideas that have been briefly articulated in this presentation debt a lot to discussions 
with Mauricio Suárez, David Teira and Juan Urrutia. 
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